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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis begun in the second half of 2007 has triggered, among many 
well-known consequences, a radical evolution phase of the classical interest rate 
derivatives pricing framework. Clearly this is not what common people care 
about after the sub-prime crisis, but is instead something that caused many 
problems for academics and practitioners. In fact, contrary to what the markets 
believed just few years ago, some issues, like credit and liquidity risk, that were 
before regarded to be negligible and then ignored, were found to have an 
important impact on the prices of financial instruments.  
In fact, since August 2007, with the sub-prime crisis that has spread a stronger 
perception of the credit and liquidity risk present within the financial markets, 
primary interest rates of the interbank market, e.g. Libor, Euribor, Eonia, and 
Federal Funds rate, started to display large basis spreads, in some cases on the 
order of hundred basis points and even more. Similarly, some other relations 
which constituted a milestone in finance broke down. In fact, the well-known 
correspondence between FRA rates and forward rates implied by two 
consecutive deposits now does not hold any more. Another evident consequence 
is the sudden and significant explosion of the basis swap spreads, which 
highlights a segmentation in the interest rate market, which is now evidently 
tenor-dependent. 
In other words, some basic relations described on standard textbook have been 
called into question, with some other relevant consequences on the way an 
interest rate derivative has to be priced.  
In fact, the above-mentioned old consistencies between rates allowed the 
construction of a single curve to be used both as a discounting curve and as a 
forward curve, which made the pricing process of a, say, interest rate swap very 
straightforward and simple from a computational point of view. 
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Failing these relations, the financial community has thus been forced to start the 
development of a new theoretical  framework aimed at taking into account the 
new market information. In other words, the interest rate market has undergone 
nothing short of a revolution. 
As a consequence, the above-mentioned structural changes have determined the 
necessity to construct not just one yield curve to use both as an interest rate 
generating curve and as a discounting curve, but as many curves as the 
underlying rate tenors are in order to generate the future cash flows, and another 
curve to discount the cash flows themselves (the so called “discounting curve”). 
This has determined a structural transition from the  so called “single curve 
approach” to the so called “multiple curve approach”, with lots of implications 
both for practitioners and for academics. 
 
2. Changes in the interest rate market after the credit 
crunch 
In this section I discuss in more details the above-mentioned changes in some 
relations that before the financial crisis were taken for granted, empirically 
demonstrating that these relations do not hold any more in the real financial 
world, thus requiring a review of the corresponding financial theory.  
As I have already said, an immediate consequence of the 2007 credit crunch was 
the divergence of rates that until that moment were basically identical, either 
because related to the same time interval or because implied by other market 
quotes. Regarding the first case we can think of, for instance, deposit and OIS 
rates with the same maturity. Another example is given by swap rates with the 
same maturity but different floating legs (in terms of tenor). As for the second 
case, that is the rates implied by other market quotes, the most common example 
is the FRA rate, which we were told that it is equal to the forward rate implied by 
two related deposits. All these rates, which were once so closely interconnected, 
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suddenly became different objects, each one incorporating its own liquidity and 
credit risk. 
 
2.1. The explosion of the EURIBOR – OIS spread 
Some of the most evident consequences of the financial crisis has been a sudden 
and strong divergence between primary interest rates, like Euribor and Libor, and 
another very important rate, the OIS rate. We will focus especially on the 
Euribor-OIS spread in this section, stressing that the same dynamics and 
conclusions hold for the Libor-OIS spread. 
Before going to analyze into details what happened to the basis between the 
Euribor rate and the OIS rate and what could be the meaning of this sudden 
discrepancy, it is important to examine more in depth what the Euribor rate, and 
the OIS rate are. 
The Euribor (Euro Interbank offered rate) is a benchmark that gives an 
indication of the average rate at which banks lend to each other unsecured 
funding in the Euro interbank market for a given period, and it is widely used as 
underlying rate in retail products like mortgages and derivatives, both in the over 
the counter market (OTC) and in the regulated one. It is more precisely defined 
as “the rate at which Euro interbank Deposits are being offered within the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) zone by one prime bank to another at 11:00 
a.m. Brussels time”. In other words, each panel bank has to submit its answer to 
the following question: “what rate do you believe one prime bank is quoting to 
another prime bank for interbank term deposits within the Euro zone?” (Euribor-
rates.eu, 2013). This means that this rate does not necessary originate from actual 
transactions, as no all banks will offer deposits every day and for each maturity, 
but is simply a calculation arising from the submissions of each panel bank. 
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The range of maturities covered by the Euribor rate is quite large, covering a strip 
of 8 maturities from 1 week to 12 months
1
, and the overall calculation for each 
maturity is given by the trimmed average of the individual fixing (excluding the 
highest and lowest 15% tails) submitted by a panel of banks (see chart below). 
 
                                                     
1
 Until November 1st 2013 Euribor-EBF published 15 Euribor rates daily. As of November 1st 2013 the 
number of Euribor rates is reduced to 8 (Euribor-rates.eu, 2013) 
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Table 1: The Table shows the current list of Euribor panel banks which contribute to the calculation of the Euribor 
rate. 
 
The contribution Panel is composed by 31 banks, selected among the EU banks 
with the highest volume of business in the money markets with a first class credit 
standing, high ethical standards and an excellent reputation, and also includes 
some large international bank from non-EU countries with important euro zone 
operations. Accordingly, Euribor rates reflect the average cost of funding of 
banks in the interbank money market at a given maturity. 
As regards the OIS rate
2
, it is the par swap rate that the fixed payer, within a OIS 
contract, has to pay to the counterparty. But let us proceed in an orderly fashion, 
first analyzing how this particular kind of swap works. 
An Overnight Index Swap is basically structured like a common swap, but with 
the particularity that here the fixed swap rate is exchanged against a floating rate 
that is calculated as the geometric mean of a daily overnight rate. 
Put another way, the floating leg is designed to replicate the accrued interest rate 
that would be earned from rolling over a sequence of daily loans at the overnight 
rate. Formally: 
       [∏(  
      
  
)   
  
   
] 
Where: 
    is the number of business days in the interest period. 
                                                     
2
 Overnight Interest Swap  
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    is the number of days in the year that is usually considered for that 
currency 
    tells us which is the number of days between two consecutive business 
days (e.g. for Fridays     ) 
      is the reference rate, which in our case is Eonia. 
Depending on the currency you are trading on, this overnight rate changes: if the 
swap is denominated in U.S dollars, then the overnight rate used will be the 
effective federal funds rate; if instead the swap is denominated in euros, then the 
overnight rate will be the EONIA(Euro Overnight Index Average), while if in 
sterling, it will be the SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). 
We are going to use the EONIA as a reference rate from now on, because we are 
going to mainly concentrate on the European market, but the same considerations 
and conclusions would be valid if we considered other markets. 
Quoting the European Central Bank’s definition (European Central Bank, 2013), 
the EONIA is “a measure of the effective interest rate prevailing in the euro 
interbank money market” and “it is calculated as a weighted average of the 
interest rates of unsecured overnight lending transactions denominated in euro, as 
reported by a panel of contributing banks”, the weights being the corresponding 
transaction volumes. It is also important to highlight that the contribution panel 
for the Eonia rate is the same as the Euribor panel (hence, we can say that the 
Eonia is the overnight Euribor rate). 
Now a practical example can be very useful to give you a snapshot of how an 
OIS swap works. In order to make things simple, let us suppose we want to 
calculate the price of a 5 days OIS whose par rate is 0.014%. 
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Table 5: Example of the functioning of an OIS swap. The difference between the interest accrued on the fixed leg 
and the one accrued on the floating leg gives you the value of the contract. We calculated the value of the contract at 
maturity of the swap, which corresponds to the amount of money that one counterparty owes to the other one. The 
data of Eonia rate are taken directly from the market (Source: own computations, data from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream) 
 
As for the floating leg the amount €266.67 is given by               
       
   
 , 
the amount €275.00 is given by                 (
       
   
) and so forth. This 
is basically a step-by-step implementation of the more generic equation above 
that allows us to get the final payment (€1,783.4) to be executed at the end of the 
period (5 days in this case) by the floating payer. As for the fixed leg, the final 
fixed payment (€1,994.4) is  simply obtained by referring to the following 
formula    [      
      
   
 ] , that is,             [       (
 
   
)]. In 
this example, we are assuming that the day count convention is actual/360. Thus, 
at the end of the period, the counterparty that owes the fixed rate will have to pay 
the positive difference between the interest accrued on the fixed leg and the one 
accrued on the floating leg (that is,                     . 
Like all the swaps, this kind of contract allows financial institutions to swap the 
interest rate they are paying on a certain contract with another one without 
having to change the terms of the loans (which is not always possible), from the 
fixed to the floating rate or vice versa, depending on their needs and 
expectations.  
OIS swaps usually have relatively short lives (often three months or less), but as 
the time goes by, since the credit crunch of August 2007, the OIS market is 
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getting more and more liquid and the long maturities are becoming more 
common (which is very useful, as we will see later on in the next chapter, for the 
bootstrapping procedure of the OIS curve). At present, there are OIS swaps with 
even ten years of maturity. For OISs of tenor up to one year there is just one 
payment at the end of the period, which is calculated as the difference between 
the interest rates accrued on the two legs of the swap. For OISs of maturity 
greater than one year there are periodical payments during the life of the swap 
according to the tenor of the two legs (e.g. every three months with a three 
months tenor, and so forth). 
The important characteristic that makes this financial instrument so important for 
the purpose of the present work is that, being the tenor of the Eonia rate very 
short, the credit and liquidity risk reflected on it is considered to be negligible 
(we will better understand the reason why we reach this conclusion in the next 
paragraph). Hence, there is a growing market consensus that the OIS rates are the 
best proxy available on the market for the risk-free rate. 
Having defined the Euribor rate and the OIS rate we can now go back to analyze 
the discrepancy that suddenly occurred starting from August 2007 and that we 
can better examine looking at the chart below. 
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Figure 1: It compares the Euribor deposit 6M trend with the Eonia OIS 6M trend. As it is evident, we see that the 
two rates closely chase each other until August 2007, when suddenly start diverging, each one incorporating its own 
credit and liquidity risk, which is negligible for the Eonia OIS rate. The corresponding spread is shown in grey (time 
interval: 20/06/2005-18/11/2013; Source: own computations, data from Thomson Reuters Datastream). 
 
As we can notice from the chart that reports the historical series of the Euribor 
Deposit 6 month rate versus the EONIA OIS 6 months rate, up until August 2007 
the two rates were almost overlapping, but then suddenly they start diverging, 
with the Euribor rate going up and the OIS rate going  down, so that the Euribor-
OIS spread, already existing but until then considered to be negligible, begin to 
increase reaching at its highest peak, in October 2008, 222 basis points (bps).  
In order to understand this dynamics, we have to analyze the timing of this 
sudden discrepancy. In fact, October 2008 is exactly when Lehman Brothers 
unexpectedly filed for bankruptcy protection, sanctioning the beginning of the 
financial turmoil, that among many consequences, has had a really strong and 
structural impact on the interbank market. Before August 2007, banks were 
willing to lend to each other, because a bankruptcy among huge financial 
institutions was deemed to be very unlikely, especially in a short period of time 
(say 3 or 6 months, which  are typical maturities in the interbank market) and, 
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above all, a possible bankruptcy was considered to be quite predictable, using 
models like the Merton model
3
.  
Unfortunately, in reference to this, the financial crisis has triggered uncertainty 
among financial institutions, that became more and more reluctant to lend to each 
other because of a sudden new perception of the counterparty credit risk, until 
then considered almost non-existent. Furthermore, this crisis showed that the 
bank balance sheets are dangerously opaque, which could imply the usage of 
erroneous data as inputs of models like the Merton’s one in order to estimate the 
“distance to default”4. Thus, the unreliability of accounting information (think of 
the practice of hiding debt using off shore balance sheet vehicles, like the 
SPV’s5) may undermine the predicting capacity of the model itself, creating the 
so called “jump to default” , thus fueling the uncertainty in the financial markets. 
In the light of the above considerations, we can now properly interpret the above 
graph, going a step further in our analysis. The Euribor-OIS spread is just a 
consequence of the different credit and liquidity risk embedded in the Euribor 
and the Eonia rates, that is not to be attributed only to the credit risk carried by 
the specific contracts, Deposits or OISs, traded in the interbank market by risky 
counterparties (Bianchetti & Carlicchi, Interest rate after the credit crunch: 
Multiple-curve vanilla derivatives and SABR, 2012) but mainly to the different 
tenors of the two underlying rates .  
In fact, in terms of tenor there is an important difference between the two rates. 
The Eonia rate, which is the rate underlying the OISs, is an overnight rate, 
namely a rate on a deposit lasting just one day. Accordingly, the floating leg of 
the OISs, as stated by Hull and White (2013), “is designed to replicate the 
aggregate interest that would be earned from rolling over a sequence of daily 
                                                     
3
 “The original Merton model is based on some simplifying assumption about the structure of the typical 
firm’s finances. The event of default is determined  by the market value of the firm’s assets in conjunction 
with the liability structure of the firm. When the value of the asset fall below a certain threshold (the 
default point), the firm is considered to be in default. A critical assumption is that the event of default can 
only take place at  maturity of the debt when the repayment is due” (Tudela & Young, 2003) 
4
 Distance-to-default is, roughly speaking, a widespread way of measuring how far an institution is from a 
default event. 
5
 Special Purpose Vehicles. 
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loans at the overnight rate”, so that given the really short tenor of this roll over, 
the risk embedded is very small. Hence, also the par swap rate of the fixed leg 
(the OIS rate) embeds the same small risk. So if we compare the 6 month OIS 
rate with the 6 month EURIBOR deposits we not surprisingly get a spread. But 
why before the crisis the spread was basically negligible? Simply because, as 
already said, before August 2008, a e.g. 6 month deposit was considered to be 
roughly equivalent to a sequence of two consecutive 3 month deposits in terms of 
risk. As a consequence no noteworthy risk premium was required for the first 
lending strategy relative to the second one. A no-arbitrage relation held between 
them. For the same reason, a 6 month deposit was considered to be equivalent to 
a sequence of refreshed overnight deposit covering a 6 month maturity. Again, 
the first strategy could be replicated by implementing the continuously refreshed 
strategy.  In other words, the financial world was not tenor-dependent because all 
the institutions participating in the interbank market were considered unlikely to 
default, whatever the duration of the lending. Thus, “since the liquidity and credit 
risk embedded in the interbank rates with different tenor was very similar (and 
small), stream of cash flows with same maturity but different tenors could be 
replicated one with each other, and all these floating legs had the same value.” 
(Bianchetti&Carlicchi, 2012)  
But then, the sudden new fear of bank insolvency triggered a review of the above 
relations, with increasing risk premium as the tenor lengthens.  
Hence, the sudden discrepancy of the two rates that embed a different credit and 
liquidity risk, and the resulting spread. 
Having said that, someone could argue that this conclusion is just theoretical, and 
that we would need a stronger proof that the above spread really reflects a new 
stronger perception of credit and liquidity risk. Someone could also be interested 
in knowing how much of that discepancy is to be attributed to the credit risk and 
how much to the liquidity risk. Starting from the latter point, Bianchetti e 
Carlicchi (2012) say that “the liquidity risk component in Euribor and Eonia 
interbank rates is distinct but strongly correlated to the credit risk component” 
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and it is very difficult to disentangle these components because “they do not refer 
to the default risk of one counterparty in a single derivative deal but to a money 
market with bilateral credit risk”. Furtermore, they are also very interconnected, 
because an institution with a low rating (implying a high credit risk) is likely to 
have many problems to collect money in the market, with resulting liquidity 
problems. Similarly, in some cases, liquidity problems may  result in a higher 
credit risk. In relation to this statement, Acerbi and Scandolo (2007, quoted by 
Bianchetti and Carlicchi,2012) say that liquidity risk may arise in the following 
cases: 
1. Lack of liquidity to cover short term obligations (funding liquidity risk) 
2. Difficulty to liquidate assets on the market due to excessive bid-offer 
spreads (market liquidity risk) 
3. Difficulty to borrow funds on the market due to excessive funding cost 
(systemic liquidity risk) 
When these circumstances occur together, the liquidity risk may result in a higher 
credit risk. This is in part what happened during the crisis. 
Thus, we cannot sharply make a distinction between credit and liquidity risk. 
Instead, we can somehow empirically demonstrate the link between the 
increasing credit risk and the appearance of the Euribor-OIS spread. One way to 
do it, is to analyze the trends followed by the Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) of 
some of the main financial institutions belonging to the Euribor/Eonia 
Contribution Panel and see if there is some kind of correlation in the path relative 
to the Euribor-OIS spread. In fact, being the CDSs a sort of insurance against the 
event of default of a certain institution, an increase in the CDS spread (that is, the 
premium that the buyer of the protection has to pay to the seller) means an 
increase in the risk appreciated by market participants. 
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Figure 2: Comparison  between the CDSs trends of some of the most important financial institutions included in the 
Euribor panel and the Euribor-OIS spread evolution over the period 20/06/2005 - 30/09/2010 (Source: own 
computations, data from Thomson Reuters Datastream). 
 
From the graph, where we overlap the path followed by the Euribor-OIS spread 
and the paths followed by the CDSs of important financial institutions, we notice 
a strong similarity in the trends. We see basically a flat trend for all the CDSs 
until August 2007, then with the beginning of the subprime crisis the CDS 
spreads start going up together with the Euribor-OIS spread. This similarity 
roughly holds  for the whole analyzed timeframe. This empirical evidence, 
besides the theoretical explanations, strongly suggests the different influence that 
the credit and liquidity risk have on the Euribor and overnight rate (hence an 
increasing Euribor-OIS spread). 
Given the meaning of the Euribor-OIS spread, since the onset of the turmoil in 
the financial markets, the latter has been taken as an important measure of the 
health of the banking system  because it reflects the  perception of banks on the 
risk associated to interbank loans, that is, the fear of banks insolvency (Thornton, 
2009). To put it another way, the increased risk premium associated to the 
Euribor deposits relative to the OIS rate, has been a direct consequence of a 
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“flight to safety” that has privileged safer contracts, like in our case, the OISs, 
that are less risky, not only for the fact that they have a shorter tenor, but also 
because the potential loss does not include the principal but only the interest rate 
differential.  
 
2.2.  FRA rates versus Forward rates 
Another important consequence of the financial turmoil has been the sudden lack 
of validity of one of the most important relations upon which great part of the 
current standard theory of derivatives is based, that is the correspondence 
between a forward rate implied by two consecutive deposits and the FRA rate in 
the same timeframe (e.g. a Euribor forward rate 6M×12M and a Euribor FRA 
6M×12M). But let us proceed in an orderly fashion. 
A Forward Rate Agreement is a forward contract that allows the buyer to lock in 
the interest rate to be paid at a future date. In more detail, the FRA implies  a 
future exchange of a variable interest rate (usually linked to a reference rate like 
Euribor or Libor) against a fixed rate, also called the FRA rate. Like all the 
vanilla swaps (that can be viewed as a collection of FRAs), the FRA is priced via 
replication, through a No-Arbitrage argument which allows us to state that the 
Euribor FRA 6×12 rate must be equal to the Forward Euribor 6×12 rate, so that 
we can calculate the FRA rate in the following way: 
                      
        
      
   
 
         
   
where     (t,Ti-1,Ti) is the Euribor forward rate, P(t,Ti) is the price of a zero-
coupon bond maturing in Ti and τ(Ti-1,Ti) is the year fraction between Ti-1 and Ti. 
As already said, this formula arises from a No-Arbitrage argument, which can be 
explained in the following way:  
If a FRA fixes in    and pays in    the final payoff in    will be [            
 ]         per unit of principal. In order to replicate this contract, you can lend 
Interest Rate Derivatives: Pricing in a Multiple-Curve Framework 
 
17 
 
spot to your counterparty  
 
              
  to receive 1 in    which can be invested 
up to    at the future market prevailing rate, so getting                   
   . 
At   , one can also borrow 
          
                   
 so to pay at    the amount [  
        ]. If we sum the two payoffs we get exactly [             ]    
    .  
 
Figure 3: This figure shows in a synthetic way the no-arbitrage argument we use in order to determine the FRA rate. 
 
Now, according to the no-arbitrage argument, the price of a FRA is equal to the 
cost of its replication, that is, in our case: 
  
 
             
 
          
                    
  
 
                                     
If we equal the above expression to zero, we get the par K 
       (
       
       
  )
 
       
               .  
If the above equation was not valid there would be arbitrage opportunities. 
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Thus, summarizing, we have demonstrated that, thanks to the no-arbitrage 
argument, we know that the fair FRA rate is the correspondent expected forward 
Euribor and this correspondence has always had an almost perfect empirical 
validation until 2007. 
Until now, everything is straightforward. But here is the breaking point. The 
relations shown above are based on the standard no-arbitrage argument but do 
not hold anymore from an empirical point of view. To better understand which is 
the size of this structural change, let us have a look at the table below, that shows 
both the Euribor FRA quotes and the Euribor forward rates (obtained  by the 
replication process seen above): 
 
Table 2: the Table compares the Euribor FRA quotes and the corresponding Euribor Forward rates (Euribor FRA 
replicas). The data, that refer to FRAs with different tenors (from 1M to 12M) show no negligible differences 
between the two rates (Source: Bianchetti&Carlicchi (2012)) 
 
This table shows important differences between the Euribor FRA quotes and the 
Euribor Forward rates (to have an term of comparison, this difference averaged 
0.88 bps in the 3 years preceding August 2007). 
To better understand which are the roots of this structural change, we have to ask 
ourselves the following question: which model hypothesis is not valid anymore? 
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As we can easily say after the comments we have made until now on the state of 
health of the interbank market, the self-evident truth is that the interbank market 
is not free of default and liquidity risk anymore, and we have more precisely seen 
this when we talked about the Euribor-OIS spread ( considered a “barometer of 
fear of bank insolvency”, as stated by Alan Greenspan). 
To be more precise, the assumptions that form the basis of the so called “model-
independent replication” and that were brought into question after August 2007 
are the Homogeneity assumption and the Stability assumption (Morini, 2009). In 
fact, before that moment, the banks included in the Euribor panel (the same thing 
holds for the Libor panel) were assumed to have an homogeneous credit risk. A 
popular belief arising from this assumption was that bank vs bank counterparty 
risk was negligible. More formally, following Morini (2009), we had:   
  
        
               
               
       
 
Where          
        and          
       are respectively the euribor rates of the 
Euribor panel banks A and B for the period (t,T), while          
       is the 
Euribor rate of a generic Euribor counterparty. This relations holds at any time t. 
Thus,                   
       at any time t. 
The Stability assumption states that the probability that an Euribor panel bank 
goes out of the Euribor panel must be considered negligible. Formally: 
 
              
 
where A is a panel bank, and    is the set of Euribor banks at time t.  
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Starting from August 2007 these assumptions are far from realistic, but who 
would have ever said before that Lehman Brothers or Citigroup would have seen 
their cost of funding suddenly increase and would have been thrown out of the 
Libor panel? Probably no one.  
These two assumptions are quite realistic in an unstressed market, where all the 
main financial institutions have funding rates (and then risk profiles) close to 
each other (and so well represented by the  Euribor), so that the homogeneity 
assumption is reasonably realistic, and  where it is also  quite reasonable to think 
that all the institutions included in the panel will remain part of it in the future. 
But, on the other side, these assumptions are misleading in a stressed 
environment like the one we have been experiencing for five years. 
In such a situation, we can neither assume that all the panel banks have similar 
funding rates, as the crisis has caused a strong divergence in them with troubled 
financial institutions paying really high rates ( thus homogeneity does not make 
any sense any more), nor we can assume that current panel banks will remain in 
the panel itself in the future (think of Lehman Brothers for instance) thus losing 
the stability assumption as well. 
By saying that homogeneity and, above all, stability do not hold anymore, we are 
theoretically admitting that it is no longer unlikely for a bank to see its credit 
standing worsened in a matter of few months, or even worse, it is not unlikely for 
a bank to go bankrupt almost overnight (like in the case of Lehman Brothers). 
This is one piece of the new information that have been embedded in the pricing 
procedure followed by all the institutions, with strong consequences. 
In more detail, given the sudden fear of bank insolvency, and being the 
insolvency more likely as the maturity of the loan gets longer, banks prefer to 
lend at shorter maturities. In fact, in this case the probability of default is lower 
and they can better cope with liquidity issues. Thus, while in the past, a 6 months 
loan  was considered to be roughly equal to two consecutive 3 months loans (as 
we have seen above, this is an important milestone in finance, and allows, 
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through a no arbitrage argument, to determine the fair FRA rate), since August 
2007 this relation does no longer hold, because it should be by now clear, a 6 
month deposit is considered to be riskier than the two consecutive 3 month 
deposits, and we will justify this statement with a simple and intuitive argument. 
Suppose a bank enters a 6 months deposit contract to lend money to an Euribor 
panel bank. Suppose after 3 months the latter bank exits the Euribor panel 
(stability fails). The lender  will be lending money at the established interest rate 
but to a bank which is not an Euribor panel bank anymore because of its 
increased cost of funding and risk profile worsening (and, even worse, the bank 
could also default, in which case the lender could lose the whole lent amount). 
Thus, the rate paid on this deposit takes this risk into account. In the case of a 3 
months deposit contract, after 3 months the lender can assess the counterparty’s 
creditworthiness, and if the counterparty default risk has increased and the bank 
has left the Euribor panel because of its increased cost of funding, it can stop 
lending to the previous counterparty and move to a counterparty which is at that 
time still an Euribor panel bank ( and given the lower risk the rate paid on the 
forward deposits will be lower). This means that the forward rate paid is lower 
than the one obtained using the replication process because the replication 
process involves also the risk embedded in the 6 months deposit, that instead 
should not affect the forward rate. Furthermore, the FRA rate does not include 
this risk also because the credit risk is mitigated by collateralization agreements 
that characterize FRA quoted contract, and that is why, in the table 2, we see the 
Euribor FRA rates constantly being smaller than the corresponding Euribor FRA 
rate implied via replication. This means that: 
                  
         
       
   
 
          
 
 
This divergence was negligible before because Euribor was considered a risk-
free rate and there was not such a fear that an Euribor panel bank would leave the 
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panel or default (with all the consequences that this fact involves). Hence, we 
conclude that the replication process tend to constantly overestimate the FRA 
rates. 
Given what we have said so far, there is another important implication of this 
new conception of the credit and liquidity risk in the interest rate market. The 
shorter is the tenor of a stream of payments in a contract, the lower is the 
embedded risk (other things being equal). The shortest tenor available in the 
market is the overnight rate, that, in the case of the European market, is the 
Eonia. This explains why the Eonia is usually considered to be a very good 
approximation for the risk-free rate.  
Accordingly, all the contracts that have as underlying rate the overnight rate 
embed a lower risk than contracts that have as underlying rate the Euribor or 
Libor (again, other things being equal). 
Thus, to be more concrete, if we have two deposits with the same maturity, say 6 
months, but the first yields a daily compounded Eonia rate (like the Eonia OIS 
rate) and the second one yields a 6 months Euribor, the first one will yield less, 
because the Euribor reflects the average default and liquidity risk of the interbank 
money market (precisely of the Euribor panel banks). 
Now, if it is true that the Eonia (and so the OIS rate) does not embed any risk, if 
we tried to calculate a FRA rate by using contracts that have as underlying rate 
the Eonia, we should find really negligible differences between the Forward rate 
implied via replication and the quoted FRA rate. In fact, in the table 3 below, we 
can see that the differences between the Eonia FRA quotes and the Eonia FRA 
replicas are really negligible. 
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Table 3: This table shows the differences between the Eonia FRA Quotes and the Eonia FRA replicas (Source: 
Bianchetti&Carlicchi (2012)) 
 
The Eonia FRA replica is calculated using the following formula: 
 
                    
 
 
                    
 
 
                    
 
Where               is the Eonia OIS rate quoted at time    with maturity   , 
             is the Eonia FRA rate covering the interval         , and  
             is the Eonia OIS rate quoted at time     with maturity    . 
As stated by Bianchetti and Carlicchi (2012), the presence of very negligible 
differences is due to the fact that “the Eonia OIS rates used for the FRA replica 
are obtained through the compounding of the Eonia overnight rate. Hence, the 
credit and liquidity risk components carried by the Eonia forward rates can be 
considered negligible and consistent with the risk premia reflected by the Eonia 
FRA market rates. 
In conclusion, we can see two graphs that summarize the historical evolution of 
the Euribor FRA 6x12, the implied 6x12 Euribor forward rate, the Eonia FRA 
6x12 and the implied Eonia 6x12 forward rate. 
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Figure 5: The figure shows the paths followed by the Euribor Forward 6x12, the Euribor FRA 6x12 and the Eonia 
FRA 6x12. As we can notice, until August 2007 these rates are almost equal, but since then they start diverging with 
the Euribor Forward 6x12 being the higher and the Eonia FRA 6x12 being the lower (Source: Bianchetti&Carlicchi 
(2012)) 
 
In Figure 5, we see that the three rates, the Euribor forward 6x12, the Euribor 
FRA 6x12 and the Eonia FRA 6x12,were basically identical before August 2007,  
when they start diverging, with the Euribor forward 6x12 being the highest, and 
the Eonia FRA 6x12 being the lowest. This is absolutely consistent with what we 
have said above, since this order reflects the different credit and liquidity risk 
embedded by the three different rates. 
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Figure 6: After August 2007, while there is a sudden and evident increase in the Euribor FRA 6x12-Eonia FRA 6x12 
spread, the Eonia FRA 6x12-Eonia Forward 6x12 spread remains negligible as before the credit crunch (Source: 
Bianchetti&Carlicchi (2012)) 
 
In figure 6, instead, we see that, starting from the beginning of the financial 
crisis, the Euribor FRA 6x12-Eonia FRA 6x12 spread, since then very negligible, 
begins to grow until reaching the highest peak in August 2008, with the Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy. At the same time we see that the Eonia FRA 6x12 and the 
Eonia forward 6x12 keep being superimposed, as we had already said looking at 
the Table 3. 
 
2.3. Increasing Basis Swap Spreads 
Another evidence of the regime change after the credit crunch is the sudden 
explosion of the Basis Swap spreads. Before going to examine more in depth this 
phenomenon, let us define what a basis swap is. A basis swap works as a 
common swap, with the difference that this time we do not have a floating leg 
against a fixed leg, but both the legs are floating although with different tenors 
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(and same maturity obviously). For instance, a common basis swap is the one 
that exchanges an Euribor 3 months floating leg against an Euribor 6 months 
floating leg.   
Basis swaps are quoted in the Euro interbank market in terms of the difference 
between the fixed par rates of two swaps. To be more precise, you take the two 
floating legs and consider them as if they were the floating legs of two different 
floating leg against fixed leg swaps. Then you calculate the par rate of the above-
said swaps. The difference between the two par rates gives you the basis swap 
quotation, that tells us how the market evaluates the two floating legs, and being 
these different only in the tenors, it tells us how the market evaluates the two 
different tenors. 
In a basis swap the tenors can range from daily to 12 months. Thus, looking at 
the basis swaps we can understand how the market considers a certain tenor 
relative to the other in terms of risk. After what we have said so far in this 
chapter, and given that a basis swap involves a sequence of FRA rates carrying 
the credit and liquidity risk discussed above (see Figure 5), it should not come as 
a surprise that before the credit crisis those spreads between different tenors were 
very negligible, while after the financial crisis they started growing more and 
more until reaching very high levels (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 7: Floating legs with different tenors. Before the crisis they were basically considered to have the same value, 
embedding the same level of risk. this equivalence was called into question after mid-2007, with the evident result of 
increasing basis swap spreads. 
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Figure 8: It shows, starting from August 2007, a growing trend in the basis swaps. For certain swaps the quotations 
were not even available before the crisis as it can be seen in the graph (Source: Bianchetti&Carlicchi (2012)). 
 
It is also interesting to look at the graph below (Figure 9), that shows the basis 
swap spreads between floating legs with different tenors (from the daily tenor, 
that has as underlying rate the overnight rate Eonia, up to the Euribor 12 months 
tenor). Figure 9 highlights a greater spread as the difference in the two tenors 
gets bigger, which is consistent with our previous statement. 
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Figure 9: The graph shows the significant level of the basis swap spreads and also highlights that the greater is the 
difference in the tenors of the two floating legs the more significant is the basis swap spread (Source: 
Bianchetti&Carlicchi (2012)). 
 
Since it is very important, we stress again that the above mentioned basis swap 
spread was present also before the crisis but negligible because the liquidity and 
credit risk embedded in the interbank rates with different tenors were very 
similar and small and in turn, as stated by Bianchetti and Carlicchi (2012), 
“stream of cash flows with the same maturity but different tenors could be 
replicated one with each other, and all these floating legs had the same value.” 
After the financial crisis we instead have a kind of  “tenor-dependent market” 
that makes floating legs with the same maturity but different tenors have 
different values (interest rate market segmentation), so invalidating the classical 
no-arbitrage relations. 
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3. The use of collateral  
Among many effects that the 2007 financial crisis has triggered there is an 
increasing diffusion of collateral agreements with the aim to reduce the increased 
counterparty risk perceived in the financial system, but in particular within the 
OTC (Over The Counter) markets. 
An OTC market is a market where two counterparties trade with one another 
without the brokerage of the exchange. While the exchange guarantees a great 
liquidity, transparency and mitigates to a great extent the credit risk involved in 
the transactions (thanks to the clearing house system and the mark-to-market 
valuation with initial and maintenance margin), the OTC markets are more 
opaque and all the transactions are characterized by a great counterparty default 
risk.  
Having the financial institutions learned the lesson, they started asking more 
often for collateral when trading in the OTC market in order to mitigate the 
counterparty risk that characterizes the OTC transactions. Of course, there are 
many other ways to address the credit risk, such as holding capital against 
exposure and close-out netting, but the collateralization remains the most widely 
used method of counterparty credit risk mitigation.  
For a more precise idea of which is the size of collateral used in the OTC market 
let us have a look at the 2013 ISDA
6
 survey
7
, that gives us a quantitative analysis 
of the phenomenon. It results from the document, that the reported amount of 
collateral in circulation in the non-cleared OTC derivatives market at the end of 
2012 was roughly $2.67 trillion (while the estimated amount reaches $3.7 
trillion), with an increase of more or less 8 percent relative to the previous year’s 
                                                     
6
 International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
7
 The survey has as respondents a total of 78 ISDA member firms which have been classified into three 
groups depending on the number of active collateral agreements. The group “large” includes firms that 
have a number of active agreements greater than 3,000 (14 firms). The group “medium” includes those 
firms that have a number of active agreements included in the range between 100 and 3,000 ( 33 firms), 
while he last group “small” includes the firms with a number of active agreements between 0 and 100 ( 31 
firms). 
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reported amount, that is,  $2.46 trillion (see Figure 10) (International Swap and 
Derivatives Association, 2013). 
 
Figure 10: the figure shows the year-by-year amount of  reported and estimated amount of collateral used in the 
market with reference to the non-centrally cleared transactions to mitigate the counterparty credit risk of OTC 
derivatives (Source: ISDA Margin survey 2013) 
 
Figure 11: The figure shows the trend of the aggregate counterparty credit exposure in OTC derivatives. More 
precisely, the data displays the net mark-to-market value of counterparty exposure, taking into account the benefits of 
close-out netting but before considering the effect of collateral in reducing the exposure (Source: ISDA Margin 
survey 2013). 
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If we compare Figure 10 with Figure 11 (that reports the gross credit exposure of 
OTC derivatives) we see that the two graphs show the same overall increasing 
trend, with the amount of reported collateral going up together with the credit 
exposure in the OTC market. This simply tells us that usually the amount of 
collateral increases when the amount of credit exposure increases. But this is not 
enough for our purposes. Then, if we want to go more into details, we can try and 
calculate a ratio that tells us the percentage of the reported collateral relative to 
the gross credit exposure of the OTC derivatives and see what has been its trend 
over the last thirteen years (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: The Reported Collateral/Credit Exposure Ratio gives us an idea of the important role that the collateral 
has assumed over the last 13 years. As we can appreciate, in 2012 the amount of collateralized exposure represents 
roughly the 72.6% of the total exposure (Source: own computations, data from ISDA Margin survey 2013). 
 
As we can see in the figure above, there is an almost always constant upward 
trend, which tells us that over the last thirteen years the amount of collateral used 
to mitigate the counterparty credit risk in the OTC market has grown  more than 
the credit exposure itself. This confirms the growing importance that 
collateralization has acquired and is still acquiring (given also the last new fear of 
counterparty risk) in the financial markets. In fact, in 2013, the percentage of 
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collateralized credit exposure is 73.7% (see Table 4 for a more detailed 
description) (International Swap and Derivatives Association, 2013). 
 
Table 4:  The table tells us which is the percentage of OTC transactions which is collateralized by OTC derivatives 
product type (Source: ISDA Margin survey 2013). 
 
The increased importance of collateral as a tool to mitigate counterparty credit 
risk, has led the vast majority of the financial institutions trading on the 
derivatives markets to give growing attention to the matter. So if few years ago 
the collateral management activity was not considered to be of great importance, 
nowadays it is deemed to play a central role. As a consequence, also the 
academic world is giving special attention to the topic. 
 
3.1. The collateralization mechanism 
Collateralization is a mean the institutions can use in order to reduce the credit 
risk involved in every transaction. 
To be clearer, suppose we enter a swap contract at par. After the stipulation, the 
value of the swap is going to change depending on the change in the market 
interest rates. Hence, the value of the swap is going to be positive for one 
counterparty and negative for the other one. The positive value represents the 
overall expected amount that the institution with a positive value is owed by the 
other one. Then, in such a situation, there is clearly a strong risk that the 
counterparty defaults prior to the expiration of the contract, thus not paying the 
owed amount. 
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The role of the collateral becomes of great importance in this case, because it can 
limit the exposure to the default risk of the counterparty and so can reduce the 
possible loss in the unlucky event. 
Let us now see in more detail how the collateralization mechanism works. 
Roughly speaking, the collateral mechanism consists of posting high-quality 
securities or cash as a guarantee against the risk of default of the counterparty. At 
every time after the contract stipulation the swap will have  a certain value which 
probably will be different from zero. This means that the counterparty whose 
value of the contract is negative (the “debtor”) owes an amount equal to the 
present value of the contract to the counterparty, so that the latter will be exposed 
to the default risk of the former. But if the two institutions have also negotiated a 
collateral agreement, they will be required to post an amount of collateral (in the 
form established in the agreement) whose value is equal to the value of the 
exposure itself. In such a case, if we suppose a perfect collateralization, the 
“creditor” will have an amount of collateral which totally covers the credit 
exposure, so that it will not suffer any loss in case of counterparty’s default, 
becoming the economic owner of the collateral posted. During the duration of the 
contract both the counterparties will periodically mark their position to market to 
calculate the net value of their exposure and depending on the change in the 
value the debtor will add the new required amount (if its exposure has increased) 
to match the new net value of the contract or vice-versa it will receive the above 
mentioned amount. Upon the collateral amount received the receiver will also 
have to pay an interest rate (in fact, the receiver is not the economic owner of the 
collateral amount until the counterparty defaults) whose characteristics are 
defined in the collateral agreement itself.
8
 
The most widely used type of collateral agreement in the OTC markets is the so 
called Credit Support Annex (CSA) which is part of a more complex and 
articulate document, the ISDA Master Agreement, that settles the terms and 
                                                     
8
 For more discussion of this see D.Brigo, M.Morini and A.Pallavicini (2013) and  Gregory (2012) 
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conditions to regulate transactions between parties
9
. In fact, as we can notice in 
the graph below (Figure 13), the 87% of the collateral agreements are those 
regulated by ISDA. 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of ISDA Collateral Agreements compared to the total amount of collateral agreements 
(Source: ISDA Margin survey 2013). 
 
For this reason  we are going to mainly concentrate upon the CSA agreements. 
The CSA is that part of the ISDA agreement that regulates the mechanics of 
collateral with respect to a host of issues such as: 
 Method and timing of the underlying valuations. 
 The calculation of the amount of collateral that will be posted. 
 Eligible collateral. 
 Interest rate payments on collateral. 
 Haircuts applied to collateral securities. 
                                                     
9
 In particular, the ISDA Master Agreement “is designed to eliminate legal uncertainties and to provide 
mechanisms for mitigating counterparty risk. It specifies the general terms of the agreement between 
parties with respect to general question such as netting, collateral, definition of default and other 
termination events” (Gregory, 2012). 
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 Triggers that may change the collateral conditions (for example, ratings 
downgrades that may determine stronger collateral requirements) 
(Gregory, 2012). 
As far the CSA is concerned, the most common form of collateral used against 
OTC derivatives exposures is cash, as we can see in Figure 14, with a percentage 
of almost 82%. As for the securities (14.2%), usually the ones posted as 
collateral are required to be liquid and of high quality, even though the financial 
crisis has shown that also government bonds and AAA-rated securities are 
nowadays far from being considered high-quality assets as they were assumed to 
be before.  
 
Figure 14: Type of collateral used to mitigate counterparty credit risk in OTC derivatives transactions (Source: ISDA 
Margin Survey 2010). 
 
It also defines some parameters that are of great importance, like the threshold, 
the independent amount, the minimum transfer amount and the haircut, that we 
are going to analyze a bit more into detail. 
Threshold 
A threshold is a minimum level of exposure, established in the agreement, under 
which the exposure itself is not covered by collateralization. In other words, the 
threshold represents the amount of exposure that is not collateralized. This means 
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that in the presence of such a parameter, only the part of the exposure that 
exceeds the threshold will be collateralized. Clearly, the higher is the threshold 
the lower is the counterparty risk mitigating effect of the collateralization 
mechanism. 
The rationale in settling a threshold is the consequent reduction in the operational 
costs of calling and returning collateral for a low exposure. In fact many 
institutions may only consider collateralization important when the exposure 
goes above a certain level. 
Independent amount 
When an independent amount is established in the collateral agreement, the 
counterparties under an OTC derivatives transaction are required to post an 
additional amount of collateral in addition to the value of the derivative’s 
exposure. It can be thought of as a kind of negative threshold, in the sense that 
while the presence of a threshold reduces the mitigating power of the 
collateralization mechanism (undercollateralization) in favor of a reduction of the 
operational costs, the independent amount entails a situation of 
overcollateralization since in this case the amount posted as collateral is greater 
that the exposure itself. As stated by Gregory (2012), “the independent amount is 
typically held as a cushion against “gap risk”, the risk that the market value of a 
transaction may gap substantially in a short space of time”, so that even if the 
counterparty defaults it is very unlikely for the creditor to suffer any loss. 
Minimum transfer amount 
A minimum transfer amount is the smallest amount of collateral that can be 
transferred from one counterparty to another. The rational in including this 
parameter into the collateral agreement is to avoid all the operations (with the 
consequent costs) that would arise from a frequent transfer of too small amounts 
of collateral.  
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The size of the minimum transfer amount is established in the contract and it is 
usually linked to the counterparty’s ratings. In fact, when the counterparty’s 
rating is low, an institution may consider to be worth paying higher operational 
costs associated with more frequent collateral calls with the aim to reduce the 
exposure. 
The presence of this parameter has as a consequence the fact that collateral can 
be only transferred in blocks equal to the minimum transfer amount. This means 
that an increased exposure which is smaller than the amount established is not 
required to be posted, giving rise to a temporary situation of 
undercollateralization. 
Haircut 
In the event that the collateral posted is composed of securities, sometime an 
haircut will be applied to the value of the collateral to take into account the fact 
that its value may go down over time. For instance, an haircut of x% means that 
for every unit of collateral posted just the (1-x)% will be considered to be 
covering the exposure. Usually, when the collateral posted is cash there is no 
haircut required. In fact, haircuts are primarily used to account for the price 
volatility of the securities posted as collateral. 
 
Overall, we can say that the haircut and the independent amount are parameters 
that enhance the risk mitigation effect of the collateralization while the threshold 
and the minimum transfer amount reduce it. 
In each CSA the definition of these parameters depends on the needs of the two 
counterparties involved in the OTC transaction to strike the balance between the 
risk mitigation effect and the operational workload. 
Another important thing to say about the CSA collateralization mechanism is that 
the interest rate paid on the collateral is the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate. 
The rationale behind this is that since the CSA calls for a daily margination, so 
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that the collateral amount can just be held for one day by the creditor, the more 
suitable interest rate to be paid on it is an overnight interest rate, such as the OIS 
rate. 
Furthermore, for a more complete understanding of the CSA agreement, we have 
to specify that, due to the very different nature of OTC derivatives 
counterparties, there exist two macro-types  of CSA agreements: the two-way 
CSA and the one-way CSA. The latter case corresponds to the one in which just 
one counterparty benefits from the collateral agreement in the sense that only one 
of the institutions is required to post the collateral when needed. Thus, this kind 
of contract represents an additional risk for the collateral giver relative to the 
situation in which there is not collateral agreement. This version of the CSA is 
common when, for example, a bank trades with an hedge fund (or any other very 
risky counterparty) requiring a collateral posting to mitigate the great and opaque 
counterparty credit risk. The two-way CSA, which is typical when we have two 
similar counterparties (think of the interbank market), requires both the 
counterparties to post the collateral in order to mitigate the risk. In the graph 
below we can see the extent to which the two types of contract are present in the 
OTC market according to the ISDA Margin Survey 2013: 
 
 
Figure 15: Percentage of two-way ISDA CSA agreements and one-way ISDA CSA agreements (Source: ISDA 
Margin Survey 2013). 
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4. Pricing Interest Rate Derivatives 
In the present chapter we are going to describe the new pricing framework that 
takes into account all the new information that arises from the last financial 
crisis.  
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the financial turmoil has demonstrated 
that those relations that were taken for granted until 2007 have to be abandoned 
if we want to build a framework as much coherent with the current market 
conditions as possible. This necessary revision entails a transition from the 
traditional single-curve approach to the new multiple-curve approach. 
More precisely, this chapter is structured in the following way: we will first 
briefly describe the features of the old single-curve approach, then we will 
introduce the new multiple-curve framework and we will explain how to apply 
the latter  to the pricing of fully collateralized OTC interest rate derivatives. This 
point will form the base for the pricing framework of uncollateralized OTC 
interest rate derivatives. 
 
4.1. The single curve approach: a brief outline 
Before mid-2007 the traditional approach to be used in order to price an interest 
rate derivative was the so called single curve approach. It consisted in selecting 
the most convenient (e.g. liquid) plain vanilla interest rate instruments traded on 
the market with increasing maturities in order to build a single curve to be used 
both as a discounting curve and as a forwarding curve. This was possible because 
of the correspondence between the forward curve and the discounting curve due 
to the fact that the Euribor (or Libor), which is the reference rate of the vast 
majority of the interest rate derivatives, was deemed to be a risk-free rate.  More 
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precisely, the procedure to be implemented for the construction of this curve can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Select one set of the most liquid vanilla interest rate derivatives traded on 
the market with increasing maturity. For example, a very common 
procedure was to select a combination of short-term Eur Deposit, 
medium-term Futures on Euribor 3M and medium-long-term Swaps on 
Euribor 6M (Ametrano&Bianchetti, 2009). 
2. By following the classic bootstrapping technique, use these instruments to 
build this yield curve. 
3. Use the above curve to extract both the forward rates, to be used for the 
future cash flows computation, and the discount factors. 
4. With the elements computed at point 3 work out the price of the derivative 
by summing up all the discounted cash flows.  
Thus, the prerogative in this selection was mainly the liquidity of the 
instruments, without regard to their underlying tenor. There was no problem in 
doing so, and everything was quite straightforward. 
 
4.2. The Multiple-Curve Pricing Framework 
4.2.1. Pricing fully collateralized Interest Rate Derivatives 
 
4.2.1.1. The Discounting Curve 
The role of a discounting curve is to allow us to calculate the present value of 
cash flows that will occur at a future point in time. Since the purpose of the 
valuation is to calculate the no-default value of a derivative, the proper 
discounting curve to be used when valuing a derivative is the risk-free 
discounting curve. 
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Before 2007, derivatives dealers used Libor (or Euribor) as reference rate in 
order to build a risk-free discounting curve and this because this rate was deemed 
to be “risk free”. Another very practical reason to use the Libor or the Euribor as 
a risk-free rate was that this made the valuation process of, say, an interest rate 
swap more straightforward because the reference interest rate was the same as 
the discount rate. Thus, the advantage was the possibility to build just one curve 
to use both as an interest rate generating curve and as a discounting curve. 
But as we have seen in the previous chapter, we can no longer consider the Libor 
and the Euribor  good proxies for the risk-free rate and this has thus called into 
question this practice with important consequences. 
One of these is that, in order to construct a risk-free discounting curve, most 
institutions are using other financial instruments based on an overnight rate, the 
OISs, to price collateralized derivatives. For example, LCH.Clearnet
10
 has 
declared that it has begun using the Overnight Index Swap rate curve to discount 
its $218 trillion IRS portfolio (LCH.Clearnet, 2010). The increasing use of the 
OIS discounting methodology is due to the fact that nowadays the OIS rates are 
considered to be the best proxy available for the risk-free rate. The latter 
statement should not come as a surprise given what we have seen in the previous 
chapter, when we have noticed a sudden increase in the Euribor-OIS spread 
starting from mid-2007 (see Figure 1). The passage from an average difference of 
10 basis points to a peak of 222 basis points in October 2008 emphasizes that 
Euribor (like Libor) is a poor proxy for the risk-free rate in stressed market 
conditions. In fact, this spread is due to the fact that banks are more and more 
reluctant to lend to each other for the already mentioned counterparty credit risk 
in the interbank market, so that we can interpret this event as due to an increased 
credit and liquidity risk embedded in the Euribor/Libor rate relative to the OIS 
rate. Actually, we have to say that even before the credit crisis there was a 
                                                     
10
 “The LCH.Clearnet Group is a leading multi-national clearing house, serving major exchanges and 
platforms as well as a range of OTC markets. It clears a broad range of asset classes, including securities, 
exchange-traded derivatives, commodities, energy, freight, foreign exchange derivatives, interest rate 
swaps, credit default swaps, as well as euro and sterling denominated bonds and repos” (LHC.Clearnet, 
2013). 
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consensus that the OIS was the best proxy for the risk-free rate, but since the 
difference between the OIS rate and the Euribor/Libor rate was very negligible, 
for practical reasons (the advantage to build only one curve both for generating 
the future cash flows and for discounting them) all the derivatives dealers used  
Euribor or Libor when valuing derivatives. Being the above mentioned difference 
no longer negligible, this trick doesn’t hold any more. 
Hence, the sudden necessity to switch to the construction of a new risk-free 
discounting curve. 
We point out that, right at this point, we have the first violation of the single-
curve approach, since now the discounting curve does not correspond to the 
forward curve anymore, because the nature of the latter is tied to the underlying 
rate of the derivative we want to price (usually Euribor or Libor). At this stage of 
our work, we can refer to this new framework as “double-curve framework”. 
We have already talked about what an Overnight Index Swap is and how it 
works, but we are going to quickly explain it again in order to make this chapter 
as much self-contained as possible. 
An OIS is a common swap in which a fixed leg is exchanged against a floating 
leg whose value is calculated as the geometric mean of a daily overnight rate, 
which for example in the Euro area is Eonia. Formally, the interest accrued by 
the floating rate receiver can be expressed in the following way (Clarke, 2013): 
       [∏(  
      
  
)   
  
   
] 
Where: 
    is the number of business days in the interest period. 
    is the number of days in the year that is usually considered for that 
currency 
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    tells us which is the number of days between two consecutive business 
days (e.g. for Fridays     ) 
      is the reference rate, which in our case is Eonia. 
 
OIS swaps used to have maturities no longer than three months, but as the time 
goes by, OIS swaps with maturities as long as five to ten years are becoming 
more common in the market. Furthermore, in the last few years, the OIS market 
is also becoming more and more liquid.  
For OIS swaps of maturity up to one year, there is just a single payment at the 
end of the period whose value is given by the difference between the interest 
accrued  on the fixed leg and the interest accrued on the floating leg (see the 
example below). For swaps of maturity longer than one year, there are 
intermediate payments, usually annual. 
Having said that the OIS rate is considered to be the best proxy for the risk-free 
rate, we have to specify that there are two sources of risk in this kind of financial 
instrument: 1) the credit risk embedded in the underlying overnight rate (Eonia, 
Federal Found Rate…) which we have argued to be very small because of its 
daily tenor (the shortest available in the market); 2) the counterparty credit risk 
arising from the potential default of one of the swap counterparties (regarding 
this, we have to highlight that, like all the swaps, there is no exchange of 
principal, so the above-mentioned risk only concerns the difference between the 
interest accrued on the fixed leg and the one accrued on the floating leg) (Hull & 
White, 2013). These two points also explain why the market has chosen this 
instrument to build a “risk-free” discounting curve. In fact, compared to the usual 
deposits, there is no exchange of principal, while compared to the other types of 
interest rate swaps the OISs have the shortest tenor available, thus incorporating 
the lowest amount of credit risk. 
Interest Rate Derivatives: Pricing in a Multiple-Curve Framework 
 
44 
 
Now a practical example can be very useful to give you a snapshot of how an 
OIS swap works. In order to make things simple, let us suppose we want to 
calculate the price of a 5 days OIS whose par rate is 0.014%. 
 
Table 5: Example of the functioning of an OIS swap. The difference between the interest accrued on the fixed leg 
and the one accrued on the floating leg gives you the value of the contract. We calculated the value of the contract at 
maturity of the swap, which corresponds to the amount of money that one counterparty owes to the other one. The 
data of Eonia rate are taken directly from the market (Source: own computations, data from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream) 
 
For the floating leg the amount €266.67 is given by               
       
   
 , 
the amount €275.00 is given by                 (
       
   
) and so forth. This 
is basically a step-by-step implementation of the more generic equation above 
that allows us to get the final payment (€1,783.4) to be executed at the end of the 
period (5 days in this case) by the floating payer. As for the fixed leg, the final 
fixed payment (€1,994.4) is  simply obtained by referring to the following 
formula    [      
      
   
 ] , that is,             [       (
 
   
)]. In 
this example, we are assuming that the day count convention is actual/360. Thus, 
at the end of the period, the counterparty that owes the fixed rate will have to pay 
the positive difference between the interest accrued on the fixed leg and the one 
accrued on the floating leg (that is,                     . 
Having said that, we are going to explain how to construct an OIS discounting 
curve. Regarding this, the issue can be easily solved by using the common 
bootstrapping process used to build the traditional Euribor/Libor term structure. 
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The problem of the OIS curve bootstrapping can be treated by dividing the curve 
into two parts: 1) a short dated region and 2) a long dated region. 
As for the first segment (up to one year) the OIS rates can be directly used to 
construct the curve since we have said that OISs with maturity less than one year 
do not pay any periodic interest, with interpolation for the intermediate dates. We 
can find par OIS rates directly quoted in the market. 
Thus, for instance, a cash flow that will be received in 6 months will be 
discounted by using the 6 month OIS rate quoted on the market. 
As for the second segment (from one year ahead), we have to use OISs with 
maturity greater than one year that pay intermediate interests. In this case, a 
traditional bootstrapping process can be used.  
Before going to outline the methodology to be used for this portion of the 
discounting curve, it may be worth saying which is the reason why we cannot 
directly use, as in the shorter part of the curve, the par OIS rates as discounting 
rates. The simple reason is that if we use the par rate of a OIS swap with maturity 
longer than one year, say two years (and then with periodic interests), the par rate 
would not reflect the required rate of return on a single cash flow that occurs in 
two years, but instead the average rate of return on all of the annual interests until 
maturity. What we want to use instead is the rate of return on an instrument that 
only pays a single cash flow in two years (in our example). Since we do not have 
such OISs for maturities greater than one year, we have to use a bootstrapping 
approach. 
Suppose we are at time    and we want to calculate a two-years OIS discount 
rate. We already have the one-year OIS discount rate which is the one-year par 
OIS rate that we took directly from the market quotes. Now we can start 
reasoning from the following equation: 
              
  [            ]
  
∑           
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Where                is par swap rate for a swap with maturity  , while 
           is equal to [            ]
  , that is, the discount factor for each 
maturity     up to   .  
The above is the usual formula we use to calculate the par rate of a swap, that we 
know to be also quoted in the market.  
Hence, with a simple algebra we obtain: 
             ∑           
   
   
              [            ]
  
   [            ]
   
Gathering up the discount factor [            ]
   , we get: 
[            ]
  [               ]
                ∑           
   
   
 
from which we easily get the discount rate for a maturity of    years: 
           [
               
               ∑           
   
   
]
 
 ⁄
   
If we use the above expression in a recursive way, starting from the one-year 
maturity OIS par rate, we can obtain all the implied discount rates for longer 
maturities.  
If the discounting curve is required for maturities longer than the one of the 
longest OIS swap available on the market, as stated by Hull and White (2013), “a 
natural approach is to assume that the spread between the OIS zero curve and the 
Libor/swap zero curve is the same at the long end as it is at the longest OIS 
maturity for which there is reliable data. Subtracting this spread from the Libor 
zero curve allows it to be spliced seamlessly  onto the end of the OIS zero 
curve.” 
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In this fashion, a risk-free discounting curve can be constructed. 
 
 
4.2.1.2. The Interest Rate Generating Curve 
When pricing an interest rate derivative, a forward curve is used to compute 
forward rates, that is, the rates that we have to use as the best predictions for the 
future cash flows generated by the floating leg of the derivative itself. In fact, 
unlike the fixed leg, at the start of the contract the forward rates are unknown.  
Obviously, given the purpose of this curve, its construction depends on the 
underlying rate of the interest rate derivative that we want to price. Precisely, if 
we want to price an Euribor-based swap, we have to construct an Euribor 
forward curve by using Euribor-based instruments and so forth. 
In order to understand which is the main change in the construction of this curve 
caused by the last financial crisis, we stress again that, in the old single-curve 
approach, the construction of the curve just required a selection of the most 
liquid instruments available on the market, regardless of their tenor.  
Having pointed out this, we can go and see how a forward curve should be now 
constructed in order to take into account the new market information. 
The new approach for constructing a forward curve needs to take into account 
one of the main consequences that was triggered starting from mid-2007, that is, 
the new strong interest market segmentation  in sub-areas corresponding to 
instruments characterized by different underlying tenors (which, as we have seen, 
has had as a clear consequence a sudden and great increase of the basis swap 
spreads). This segmentation was due to a new tenor-dependent market that made 
the old no-arbitrage relations inconsistent. For this reason, we have seen that the 
risk carried by a 6 month loan was greater than the risk carried by a refreshed 3 
month loan with obvious consequences on the lending costs. 
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In the light of what we have just said, the market practice has now evolved to 
take into account this new market information, with the consequence that another 
requirement for the pricing of a derivative is now needed in order not to get 
“dirty” results: the homogeneity of the forward curve. To be clearer, this has a 
double meaning: first, homogeneity between the underlying tenor of the 
derivative of which we want to work out the price and the tenor of the forward 
curve, secondly homogeneity in the tenor of the bootstrapping instruments 
selected for the curve construction. In practice, this implies that if we want to 
price a, say, Euribor swap with a tenor of 6 months, we have to construct a 
specific 6-month forward curve by using only instruments consistent with that 
tenor. 
If we do not follow this rule we run the risk to create a forward curve that 
embeds different levels of risk depending of the different tenors of the 
instruments used as well as a level of risk which is not coherent with the risk of 
the underlying tenor of the interest rate derivative we want to price.  
More generally, as a consequence of this tenor-dependent interest rate market, all 
the institutions operating on the derivative market have to construct a specific 
curve for each tenor available on the market. This implies a further multiplication 
of the curves we are required to use in order to price interest rate derivatives:  we 
need as many forward curves as the tenors available on the market are. That is 
why the new pricing approach is now referred to as “multiple-curve framework”. 
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Figure 16: Forward curves with different underlying tenor. As we can appreciate, the longer is the tenor the higher is 
the curve. This confirm the already clear fact that as the tenor increases investors require an higher rate, as a form of 
premium for the higher credit and liquidity risk embedded in the tenor itself. 
 
Bearing this in mind, let us go and see more into detail which are the market 
instruments to be selected in order to build the curve. 
The first thing to say is that different bootstrapping instruments are used to 
construct different segments of the forward curve depending on their maturity. 
Now we are going to briefly describe the most common ones used for this 
purpose starting from the ones that we have to use for the short segment. 
Deposits 
Interest rate Deposits are Over-The-Counter contracts that start at reference date  
   (today or spot
11
) and pay an interest rate fixed at inception. At the end of the 
contract the borrower will have to pay back the principal amount plus the interest 
accrued over the whole period. In the European market you can find interest rate 
Deposits  with maturity up to one year. Particular Deposits are the over-night 
(ON) Deposits and the tomorrow-next (TN) Deposits which last just one day and 
start today and tomorrow respectively. Thus, these instruments can be used to 
construct the initial part of the curve up until one year. Clearly, coherently with  
what we have said before, for each forward curve, depending on the tenor of the 
                                                     
11
 Spot means two business days after today  
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derivative we have to price, we can select only that Deposit with the same tenor 
as the derivative’s. 
Forward Rate Agreement (FRA) 
Forward Rate Agreements are basically forward starting Deposits. They are 
quoted on the European market in terms of par rate with the following notation: 
e.g. 3×6 FRA, that is a Deposit starting in 3 months from today and lasting 3 
months. The positive characteristic of these instruments for the construction of 
the forward curve is that, since the market quotes FRAs with different starting 
dates, they concatenate exactly (e.g. a 6×12 FRA and a 12×18 FRA can be used 
for the construction of the curve going from 6 months to 18 months from today 
without overlapping). 
These instruments allow us to have an empirical evidence of the fact that we 
cannot use a single curve to estimate FRA rates with different tenors. 
To do this, let us take FRA quotes from the market both at a pre-crisis date and at 
a post-crisis date so that we can better appreciate the change that the interest rate 
market has undergone: precisely we take a 6×12 FRA and a 12×18 FRA both 
starting at spot date         business days, with     being January 10, 2005 
and 2014. Starting from the pre-crisis case we have that       
          
      ,       
                 . If we wanted to calculate the implied 
6x18 FRA rate through a no-arbitrage argument we would obtain: 
            
         
 
[        
                ]  [        
                  ]   
       
         
With the clarification that       , which is the time interval covered by the FRA 
contract, is computed using the             day count convention, so that 
          
     
   
 . 
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The level of the market quote for the 6×18 FRA rate is         
          
       with a difference of just 1.22 bps (which is very negligible). Thus, the 
no-arbitrage relationship held, so that you could extract the 1-year curve from the 
6-month curve or, in other words, a single curve could be used to estimate FRA 
rates with different tenors. 
On the other hand, if we try to replicate the same process using post-crisis FRAs 
quotes we not surprisingly get a different conclusion. Going into detail, we have 
that at   , corresponding to January 10, 2014,       
                 and 
      
                . Using the same formula as above, we can calculate 
the implied 6×18 FRA rate, so that we have: 
            
         
 
[        
                ]  [        
                  ]   
       
        
While the market quote for the 6×18 FRA rate is        
              , with 
a difference of 12,5 bps (which is not negligible anymore!). The last difference 
“is the price assigned by the market to the different liquidity/default risks implicit 
in the two investment strategies (Ametrano&Bianchetti, 2013), namely in our 
example, using a 6×18 FRA or using two consecutive FRAs (6×12 FRA and 
12×18 FRA). 
This means that nowadays we can no longer use a single curve to estimate FRA 
rates with different tenors. Then, this empirical example restates that a specific 
curve has to be constructed for each tenor x using FRAs with the same tenor x for 
the construction of the short-term part. 
 
Futures 
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Interest Rate Futures are exchange-traded contracts equivalent to the over-the-
counter FRAs. Accordingly, they are very standardized derivatives, (unlike FRAs 
which are customizable) subject to daily marking to market. These characteristics 
make these contracts very liquid because they reduce the credit risk and the 
transaction costs. 
The market quotes the futures in terms of price rather than in terms of rates, with 
the quoted price being the result of the following equation: 
  
                    
             , 
Another important thing to say is that once we have the rate   
    implied in the 
price of the Future, if we want to get the corresponding forward rate    we have 
to add a convexity adjustment so that we have: 
               
                           
This rate can be used for the construction of the short-medium segment of the 
forward curve. 
 
Interest Rate Swaps 
Interest Rate Swaps are Over-The-Counter derivatives in which two institutions 
agree to exchange fixed against floating rates.  In particular, the fixed leg pays 
annual interests while the floating leg pays floating interests with a x-months 
frequency, depending on the tenor of the underlying rate. 
The market quotes the par rate of the swaps. 
Market Swaps on x-tenor Euribor can be used as bootstrapping instruments for 
the construction of the medium-long part of the x-tenor forward curve (in some 
case, when the swaps are available, we can use them to construct the curve up to 
60 years). 
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More into details, in order to extrapolate the forward rate spanning over the 
future interval         (which is the tenor x of the curve we want to construct), 
by using an interest rate swap with maturity    and tenor corresponding to the 
interval, we can use the following formula: 
         
 
                     
 [(            ∑        
 
   
            
 ∑       
   
   
                    )] 
Where    {        } is the schedule of the floating leg,    {        } is the 
schedule of the fixed leg,         and      . Furthermore: 
          is the discount factor spanning from    to    while          is 
the discount factor spanning from    to     
             is the par rate of a swap with tenor x 
               is the time interval (corresponding to the tenor) of the 
floating rate based on Euribor. 
              is the time interval of the fixed leg 
         is the   
   forward rate we use to calculate the future cash flows, 
with x being the tenor. 
Basis Swaps 
Finally we have to stress the importance of the basis swaps in the bootstrapping 
process. These instruments are quoted on the market in terms of the difference 
between the par rate of the higher frequency leg and the par rate of the lower 
frequency leg (in fact, we have already specified above that the basis swaps are 
considered as a portfolio of two swaps corresponding to the two floating legs). 
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The above difference is normally positive because of the tenor-dependent 
counterparty risk embedded in underlying rates with different tenor.  
Their role in the process is to allow practitioners to build the long-term part of a 
forward curve on an Euribor tenor for which we do not have long-term swaps. 
Basically, if we have just swaps on Euribor 6M for very long maturities (from 
30Y to 60Y) we can start from those quotations to imply the level of the needed 
x-tenor swaps par rate that we can use to build the final part of our x-tenor 
forward curve. For example, if we have the quotation of a Basis Swap 3M vs 6M 
that we call               we can extrapolate the implied quotation for the 3M 
swap rate in the following way: 
                          
Where       and       are the par rates of the swap on 3M Euribor and on 6M 
Euribor respectively. 
 
Having talked about both the construction of the OIS discounting curve and the 
interest rate generating curve, we can now briefly summarize the complete 
procedure that one should follow in order to properly price interest rate 
derivative: 
1. Build an OIS discounting curve by using the Overnight Index Swaps and 
the traditional bootstrapping rules. 
2. Select different sets of vanilla interest rate instruments with increasing 
maturity for each tenor. As we said, instruments within the same set have 
to be homogeneous in the underlying tenor (now the selection criterion is 
not only the liquidity).  
3. Use each set of x-tenor instruments to construct the corresponding x-tenor 
interest rate generating curve following the traditional bootstrapping rules. 
Interest Rate Derivatives: Pricing in a Multiple-Curve Framework 
 
55 
 
4. Using the forward rates provided by the forwarding curve, generate the 
expected cash flows that the interest rate derivative we want to price is 
supposed to generate. 
5. Using the discount factors provided by the OIS discounting curve 
calculate the present values of the expected future cash flows, and 
eventually sum them up. 
 
The above process can allow us to calculate the default-free value of an interest 
rate derivative. 
 
4.2.2. Pricing non-collateralized interest rate derivatives 
We now briefly outline the pricing methodology for non-collateralized OTC 
derivatives, that is those derivatives where the two institutions that enter the 
contract are completely exposed to the risk that the counterparty will not pay 
back the owed amount. Even in this case, since the purpose of the valuation is to 
calculate the no-default value of a derivative we have to refer to the framework 
explained as regards the fully collateralized derivatives. 
Clearly, this is for a base valuation. As stated by Hull and White (2012), “ the 
credit risk of the two sides is in practice taken into account by a Credit Valuation 
Adjustment (CVA)
12
 and a Debit Valuation Adjustment (DVA)
13”, so that the 
overall value of an uncollateralized derivative after the credit adjustment is given 
by:  
              
                                                     
12
 CVA is the reduction of the value of a derivative to allow for a possible default by counterparty. It is 
calculate in the following way:             ∑                          
 
    where           
is the Loss give Default with    being the recovery rate of the counterparty,     is the risk-free discount 
factor,     is the expected exposure of the counterparty and     is the probability of default of the 
counterparty 
13
 DVA is the increase in the value of a derivative to allow for a default by the dealer and it is calculated 
in the following way:             ∑                          
 
    where the subscript   stands 
for dealer. 
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Where     is the no-default value of the derivative. 
5. Building an OIS Discounting Curve and Multiple-Curve 
Pricing 
The present chapter constitutes the practical part of the whole work. More 
precisely, we are going to concretely construct an OIS discounting curve by 
using the real data taken directly from the market and following the rules we 
have highlighted in the previous chapter. After completing the construction of the 
discounting curve we are going to calculate the par rate of a fully collateralized 
2-year Euribor swap referring to the new pricing framework we have described. 
The latter task will also require the usage of forward rates in order to project the 
future expected cash flows. 
Starting from the OIS discounting curve the first thing we need is to choose a 
point in time in which we start constructing the curve. In our case, we take the 
OIS market quotes on January 10
th
 2014 for all the maturities available. For 
simplicity of computation, we assume a 30/360 day-count convention for all 
rates, even though we specify that in practice Actual/360 and Actual/365 are 
commonly used. This assumption does not affect the goodness of the curve 
construction. 
After these clarifications, we display below the market quotes on day January 
10
th
 2014 (Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream): 
  
Maturity OIS Par Rate (bps) 
1W            0,001640 
2W            0,001620 
3W 0,001690 
1M            0,001640 
2M            0,001670 
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3M             0,001630 
4M             0,001640 
5M             0,001610 
6M             0,001630 
7M             0,001620 
8M             0,001580 
9M             0,001610 
10M             0,001560 
11M             0,001600 
1Y  0,001560 
15M          0,001635 
18M          0,001725 
21M  0,001840 
2Y  0,002070 
3Y          0,003066 
4Y          0,006041 
5Y          0,008372 
6Y    0,010600 
7Y          0,012672 
8Y          0,014551 
9Y          0,016238 
10Y          0,017728 
 
Table 6: OIS par rates  for the corresponding maturity (Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream). 
 
We point out again that the OIS swaps with maturity within 1 year do not pay 
any intermediate interest, then we can directly use their par rates as discount rates 
for the construction of the very short part of the curve. 
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To clarify the above statement think of a 1-week OIS swap with a principal equal 
to 1000€ and a quoted par rate of 0.00164 bps. We know that at inception the 
floating leg has a value equal to the principal value, so that, being the swap 
quoted at par, at inception also the fixed leg will have a value of 1000€. We can 
now consider the fixed leg as a zero coupon bond that pays at the end of the 
contract an amount of 1000.03 (given by      [         (
 
   
)]). Then we 
have that      
       
     
 
   
  
, with the trivial result that the discount rate is 
          bps (which is exactly the quoted par rate). 
An important specification regards the OISs with maturity between 1 and 2 years 
(15M, 18M, 21M, 2Y) that we have selected, for which the tenor of the 
intermediate payments is quarterly. For the rest of the selected OISs, instead, the 
underlying tenor is annual. As already specified in the previous chapter, the 
presence of periodical payments do not allow us to directly take the quoted par 
rate to be used as discount rate for the corresponding OIS maturity but we will 
have to use the procedure illustrated in chapter 3 that we can one more time 
summarize in the following more intuitive way: let us suppose we have a 15-
month OIS swap with a par rate of, say, 0.001635 bps, a principal value of 
1000€, and quarterly intermediate payments. Starting from the above 
consideration that the value of the floating leg is equal to the principal value at 
inception and so the fixed leg value, we can consider the fixed leg as a coupon 
bearing bond with quarterly coupons of 0.40875€ (given by 1000×0.00163×
  
   
). 
Thus, we have: 
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(        
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Where      
    is the discount rate for a maturity of 3 months and so forth. Since 
we can take the par rates of OIS with maturity smaller than 1 year as the discount 
rates, we can rewrite the above equation in the following way: 
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At this point it is quite trivial to extrapolate the implied value of the 15-month 
OIS discount rate, which is: 
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Since we now have the 15-month OIS discount rate we can go on to calculate 
with the same procedure the 18-month OIS discount rate, which is given by: 
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As it is now clear, using this formula in a recursive way will allow us to get all 
the discount rates corresponding to all the maturities of the OISs selected for the 
bootstrapping process. Then, in the table below, there are all the discount rates 
bootstrapped with the above mentioned technique: 
Time of Maturity OIS Discount Rates 
(Spot Rates) 
OIS Discount Factors 
1W                     0.001640000 0.999968112 
2W 0.001620000 0.999937004 
3W 0.001690000 0.999901426 
1M 0.001640000 0.999863352 
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2M 0.001670000 0.999721744 
3M 0.001630000 0.999592666 
4M 0.001640000 0.999453632 
5M 0.001610000 0.999329616 
6M 0.001630000 0.999185664 
7M 0.001620000 0.999055892 
8M 0.001580000 0.998947775 
9M 0.001610000 0.998793956 
10M 0.001560000 0.998701688 
11M 0.001600000 0.998535481 
1Y 0.001560000 0.998442430 
15M 0.001636370 0.997958713 
18M 0.001726987 0.997416213 
21M 0.001842816 0.996785439 
2Y 0.002074442 0.995868258 
3Y 0.003679919 0.989080787 
4Y 0.006126330 0.976080828 
5Y 0,008677462 0.958416868 
6Y 0.011127428 0.937413962 
7Y 0.013509622 0.913602986 
8Y 0.015785959 0.887872630 
9Y 0.017953730 0.860893721 
10Y 0.019996795 0.833355592 
 
Table 7: The table displays both the stream of OIS spot rates and the stream of OIS discount factors for the 
corresponding maturity. 
 
At this point, we have all we need to start the construction of the OIS Spot Rate 
Curve. In the following graph we plot all the spot rates we have found above to 
get a graphic representation of the stream of discount rates over time:  
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Figure 17: The figure shows the plot of spot rates ranging from 2014 to 2024. 
 
Obviously, at this stage of the construction we just have the spot rates 
corresponding to the maturities of the selected bootstrapping instruments. But in 
order to price any plain vanilla instrument we need a continuous curve which 
gives us the value of the spot rates for any given point in time. Thus, the solution 
to this problem is to use interpolation to get all the spot rates in between the 
bootstrapped points. The result is the following graph: 
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Figure 18: Complete representation of a 10-year OIS Spot Rate Curve after using interpolation. 
 
From the above curve it is quite trivial to extrapolate the OIS discounting curve 
which is obviously a plot of all the discount factors corresponding to the already 
calculated spot rates. In particular, OIS discount factors are simply obtained by 
using the usual formula which, considering the simple capitalization, is: 
 
      
    
     
   
  
 . Using this formula for every discount rate we can obtain the 
corresponding discount factor (see Table 7). Here is the final result: 
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Figure 19:  Plot of the OIS discount factors over the period of time 2014-2024. 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Complete OIS Discounting Curve over the period of time 2014-2024. 
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We have constructed an OIS discounting curve up to 10 years from now which 
will allow us to calculate the present value of future risk-free cash flows that will 
occur within this period of time. Needless to say that we could also lengthen our 
discounting curve by using OIS swaps with increasing maturity (up to 30 years), 
while as for the maturities for which we do not have quoted OISs, we can resort 
to that expedient of assuming that the spread between the OIS zero curve and the 
Libor/swap zero curve is the same at the long end as it is at the longest OIS 
maturity for which we have available data. After calculating the latter spread we 
can subtract it from the long-end Libor/swap curve so obtaining the long-end part 
of our OIS discounting curve. 
The final step of the practical part of this work is to calculate the par rate of a 
simple vanilla interest rate swap by using the new pricing framework we have 
talked about earlier in the previous chapter. As we have extensively said, this 
framework entails the usage of two distinct curves, one to discount and the other 
one to project the cash flows. For this reason we can define this framework  
“Dual-Curve Approach”. We also stress again that we actually need a forward 
curve whose tenor is coherent with the tenor of the instrument we want to price. 
This means that as we move to pricing an instrument with a certain tenor to 
another instrument with different tenor we have to use, and then construct, 
another forward curve (that is why this new framework is also commonly 
referred to as “Multiple-Curve Approach”). 
More precisely we are now going to price
14
 a 2-year Euribor swap with a tenor of 
6 months. This means that the two counterparties that enter the contract will have 
to pay the owed periodic amount (both fixed and floating) every six months. This 
implies that we need to construct a 6-month forward curve to project the future 
floating cash flows that our swap is expected to produce over time. As 
discounting curve we can use the OIS curve constructed above. 
                                                     
14
 We point out that in this case when we say “pricing a swap” we mean calculating its par rate at 
inception, that is the rate that will be contractually established to be paid by the counterparty that pays the 
fixed rate of the contract. 
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As regards the forward curve we limit ourselves to construct it up to two years, 
that is just the range of time needed to price a 2-year swap. This entails the 
choice of the instruments to be used in the forward curve construction. As we 
said in chapter 3, for the short part of the curve the more suitable instruments are 
deposits, FRA and futures. Since we are going to price a swap with an underlying 
tenor of 6 months, we will select instruments with a coherent tenor.  
In order to price a 2-year swap we take again as  reference date January 10
th
 2014 
and we assume a 30/360 day count convention. Going into more details about the 
selection of the instrument to be used for the forward curve construction, we 
chose an 6-month Euribor Deposit starting on January 10
th
 2014 for the first 
interest payment owed 6 months after the stipulation. Then we select an Euribor  
FRA 6x12, an Euribor FRA 12x18  and an Euribor FRA 18x24, each one settled 
on the same date as the Deposit, that allow us to cover the whole period without 
problems of overlapping. In fact, the latter is an important reason in our selection 
process. Clearly one should also consider the liquidity of the instruments 
selected, but in this particular case 6-month FRAs are quite liquid contracts 
compared to Futures since the vast majority of Futures has a 3-month tenor. In 
the following table we display the forward rates we are going to use: 
                   Covered Time               Forward Rates  
0-6m 0.00390 
6m-12m 0.00431 
12m-18m 0.00520 
18m-24m 0.00692 
 
Table 8: 6-month Forward Rates spanning from the reference date January 10th 2014 up to 2 years. 
 
As for the discount factors we use, among those we have calculated previously, 
the ones that cover the period going from reference date to 6m, 12m, 18m and 
24m. 
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                  Covered Time          OIS Discount Factors 
0-6m 0.999185664 
0-12m 0.998442430 
0-18m 0.997416213 
0-24m 0.995868258 
 
Table 9: OIS discount factors with maturity corresponding to dates in which the future cash flows will occur. 
 
At this point we have all we need to price a 2-year Euribor swap.  
In order to get to the final formula we start by the following intuitive assumption 
that holds at inception of the swap agreement: 
              
That is, the value of the fixed leg must equal the value of the floating leg. As we 
have already stated, one of the most common swap pricing technique is to 
interpret this contract as a long/short combination of floating-rate and fixed-rate 
bonds corresponding to the two legs. Thus, in our specific case, we can rewrite 
the above equation in the following way: 
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Where     is the forward rate going from time z to y,     
    is the OIS discount 
rate spanning from spot to time x, and     is the swap par rate we are looking for. 
Now, substituting the data displayed in Table 8 and 9 into the above equation we 
have: 
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At this stage, with a simple algebra, we can obtain the equilibrium par rate of the 
2-year Euribor swap we are working on, which is: 
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Then, according to the new pricing framework this is supposed to be the 
equilibrium par rate of a 2-year Euribor swap which starts on January 10
th
 2014. 
6. Conclusions 
The present thesis aims at describing the evolvement of interest rate derivatives 
pricing after the financial crisis of 2007-2008. In fact, the latter has structurally 
changed the financial world and some of the basic rules that before were taken 
for granted and that constituted a milestone in the financial theory. The above 
mentioned changes, such as the basis swap spreads explosion, the sudden 
segmentation of the interest rate market in sub-areas corresponding to instrument 
characterized by different underlying tenors, the sudden lack of correspondence 
between FRAs and forward rates implied by no-arbitrage argument, and 
eventually the increased OIS-Euribor spread, has led both academics and 
practitioners to bring into question the pricing framework commonly accepted in 
the financial community.  
Interest Rate Derivatives: Pricing in a Multiple-Curve Framework 
 
68 
 
The main focus of this thesis is on the most relevant change stemmed from this 
financial turmoil, that is the transition from a single-curve pricing approach to a 
multiple-curve pricing approach. In fact, before the crisis, pricing an interest rate 
swap was considered to be quite straightforward since we just needed to 
construct a single curve from which to compute the forward rates, the future cash 
flows and the discount factors. But in mid-2007 some important relations broke 
down and rates that until that moment followed each other started to diverge. 
These abnormalities are explained to a large extent by credit and liquidity risk 
that suddenly showed up in a sizable way. For example, the increase divergence 
between the Euribor and the OIS rate makes it evident that the former rate cannot 
be assumed to be a risk-free rate anymore. In fact, the market has switched to 
deem the OIS rate as the best proxy available for the risk-free rate. This has led 
to a first violation of the single-curve approach since now the risk-free 
discounting curve is no more the Euribor curve, but the OIS discounting curve. 
But we have also seen that another consequence has been the interest rate market 
segmentation that broke down the old no-arbitrage relations that made it possible, 
for instance, to extract a 6-month forward curve from a 3-month forward curve 
without leading to “dirty” results. But since now instruments with different 
underlying tenors embed sizable credit and liquidity risk differences, first we can 
no longer use instruments with different underlying tenors to construct a single 
curve, and secondly we can no longer extract one curve from one another. To put 
it another way, if we want to price an interest rate derivative, we need to directly 
construct a forward curve characterized by the same tenor as the one of the 
derivative, by using instruments with the same underlying tenor. This means that 
we need different forward curves  depending on the underlying rate of the 
instruments we want to price. This lead to a further multiplication of the curves 
that the new pricing framework requires. Hence the definition of “multiple-curve 
pricing framework”. 
Since the great importance that the collateralization is assuming over time as a 
risk mitigating mechanism especially during this time of strong counterparty risk 
fear, and since the vast majority of the OTC derivatives are collateralized, we 
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dedicated a part of this work to describe how the collateralization mechanism 
works. 
We also explained which is the procedure to use when constructing an OIS 
discounting curve and when constructing an Euribor forward curve through the 
classical bootstrapping methodology.  
In the last chapter of the thesis, which is the practical section, we put into 
practice what we said about the OIS curve construction, and using the real 
market data starting from January 10
th
 2014 we constructed an OIS discounting 
curve until 10 years of maturity. Finally, we used this curve in order to price a 2-
year Euribor swap with a tenor of 6 months. In order to do this, we selected the 
proper instruments to be used as forward rates for the projection of the future 
cash flows. 
In conclusion we state that the multiple-curve pricing approach is to be 
considered the proper way of dealing with interest rate derivatives pricing, 
because is coherent with the new information embedded by the market after the 
financial turmoil of 2007-2008. 
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